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THE THREAT OF SYNTHETIC SMALLPOX – 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores how advances in synthetic biology, and the potential threat of 
deliberately recreating and spreading smallpox, are affecting the multilateral debate on 
the remaining variola virus stocks. It draws on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
10 high-profile, European-based experts in biosecurity and synthetic biology. 
Four overarching themes impacting the retention/destruction debate are discussed, 
relating to biosecurity, dangerous knowledge, accidental releases, and eradication. The 
article concludes that while synthetic biology seems to affect all the main discourses 
within the variola stocks debate, a range of views is present and it is not apparent that 
advances in synthetic biology are causing a shift towards either retention or destruction 
of the stocks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 2	
The Smallpox Stocks Debate 
 
In December 1979, the World Health Organization (WHO) celebrated one of global 
health’s greatest accomplishments: the eradication of smallpox, one of the most lethal 
diseases humankind has ever faced. Since then, stocks of the variola virus that causes 
smallpox have been kept at two WHO Collaborating Centres, one in the USA and one in 
the Russian Federation. From early on, these stocks were controversial. By 1986, with no 
new smallpox cases reported, the World Health Assembly—the decision-making body of 
the WHO—resolved to destroy the strain collections and make the virus extinct. But there 
was resistance to the idea; in particular, from microbiologists keen to continue medical 
research on the virus. This resistance has endured, and a final decision on stock 
retention/destruction has still not been reached. 
In the years since stock destruction was first tabled, the science for understanding 
infectious diseases and inventing defences against them has made significant advances. 
These trends have led to a diminished need to use live variola virus for research, and have 
reduced public health needs to retain smallpox stocks (1). But there have also been other 
scientific advances that impact the debate, most significantly in the field of synthetic 
biology. In recent years it has become technically possible to recreate the variola virus 
from scratch: “While recreating variola is quite complex, it is increasingly possible due 
to the availability of genetic material and of machines for complex assembly, as well as 
increasing know-how among a broad array of persons. Furthermore, the rapid rise in 
availability of genetic material from commercial sources and the so-called ‘grey market’ 
is driving the cost of this material down, making re-creation possible by multiple 
institutions and persons, including those with malicious intent” (2). Illustrating the point, 
a group of Canadian researchers led by virologist David Evans at the University of 
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Alberta recently claims to have synthesized the extinct horsepox virus, a relative of 
smallpox, from genetic pieces ordered in the mail for around $100,000 (3). While the aim 
of the as-yet unpublished experiment performed in 2016 was to “help unravel the origins 
of a centuries-old smallpox vaccine and lead to new, better vaccines or even cancer 
therapeutics”, it has also been pointed out that the technique Evans used could be used to 
recreate smallpox (3,4,5). These sorts of scientific developments mean the risk of 
smallpox re-emerging can never be fully eradicated.  
The aim of this article is to explore how advances in synthetic biology, and the 
potential threat of deliberately recreating and spreading smallpox, are affecting the debate 
on the remaining variola stocks. The lack of historical data on the deliberate spread of 
disease means biological threat judgements rest largely on expert opinions (6). To date, 
much of the expert commentary on the smallpox re-emergence debate, as well as the 
larger biosecurity debate around synthetic biology, has been dominated by US 
perspectives. This article reports on a pilot project specifically investigating European 
expert perspectives to explore how these views may or may not differ from US 
perspectives. While synthetic biology includes different engineering techniques, the study 
focuses particularly on those that allow the reconstruction of a virus, achieved for the first 
time in 2002 by Cello, Paul and Wimmer and their team who reconstructed the polio 
virus, and shortly thereafter, in 2005, by Tumpey and his team who reconstructed the 
1918 influenza virus (7,8). Four overarching themes affecting the retention/destruction 
debate emerged from the interviews; these relate to biosecurity, dangerous knowledge, 
accidental releases, and eradication, and will be discussed in turn. 
 
Methods 
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The project draws on in-depth semi-structured interviews with 10 senior European-based 
experts in biosecurity and synthetic biology. Participants were recruited on the basis of 
three inclusion criteria: they had to be based within Europe, have a background in 
biosecurity and/or synthetic biology (preferably both), and be knowledgeable about the 
smallpox stocks debate.  A snowball sample was constructed. Recruitment was through 
personal contacts and email. The final sample consisted of 6 experts based in the UK, 2 
in Germany, 1 in Denmark, and 1 in Switzerland. 8 experts worked in academia, 1 in a 
think tank and 1 in the biotech industry. 9 experts were male, 1 was female.  
The interviews took place between October and December 2016 via Skype, 
telephone or face-to-face depending on the participants’ preference and logistical issues. 
The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. All were audio-recorded and 
transcribed. 
The interviews started with a short introduction from the interviewer aimed at 
triggering comparison between U.S. and European states’ involvement in the WHO 
smallpox stocks destruction debate. We then asked a series of open-ended questions, 
allowing space for impromptu questions and discussion. Standard questions covered in 
all interviews included: How balanced, or representative of different opinions, do you 
find the reports on smallpox stocks destruction? Is there a ‘non-US’ perspective? In what 
way do the new engineering techniques introduced by synthetic biology affect the debate, 
if at all? What do you think about the idea of complete eradication in a world where we 
have the ability to synthesize a virus in the laboratory? How likely is a ‘man-generated’ 
epidemic? How accessible is scientific information on how to re-create a virus? How 
confident are you that all smallpox samples have been transferred to the two high-security 
laboratories in the U.S. and Russia? Should this affect ‘our’ [European] judgment on 
whether to keep the stocks?  
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In presenting the interview findings, we have in general sought to present the 
majority opinion and chosen the best quote to illustrate that view to the reader. However, 
where interesting and relevant minority opinions were found, they have been included to 
convey the variation. 
 
Biosecurity 
 
The likelihood of deliberate re-introduction of smallpox formed a core element of the 
study interviews. While acknowledging that the likelihood of deliberate smallpox re-
introduction is ultimately unknown, the interviewed experts assessed the risk to be small, 
but increasing with advances in synthetic biology—reflecting similar findings from other 
studies in the field such as that by Gaudioso and colleagues (9).  
As part of the risk assessment discussions, the experts also focused on the sorts of 
actors who might use synthetic biology to deliberately recreate smallpox. Some 
highlighted the role of non-state actors and noted, for instance, that: “Traditionally we’ve 
said that biological weapons, in particular complicated ones, like variola, could only be 
produced by state actors. … In my opinion synthetic biology fundamentally changes the 
debate. …threat [assessments hinge on] whether or not a non-state actor could 
theoretically access this type of weapon. And the answer to that is [now] yes, at least 
theoretically, they can access it. And, in ten years’ time, the argument will probably not 
even be theoretical anymore.” Similarly, another expert said that with advances in 
synthetic biology “the [stock retention/destruction] discourse has to be problematized, 
unpacked, and expanded to include the non-state actor threat and the impact of synthetic 
biology.”  
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Most experts interviewed, however, focused on state, or state-sponsored, actors. 
While they agreed synthetic biology may create an ‘opportunity’ for non-state actors to 
recreate the virus, they stressed that this does not mean it has become an easy process. 
They noted that using synthetic biology to recreate viable viruses is still at an early stage, 
and that scientists are struggling with the various steps involved. It was also emphasised 
that creating a viable virus is not the same as creating a biological weapon, and that the 
weaponisation process is long and complicated. The findings echoed those of other 
studies focusing on European or international perspectives such as Lentzos (2014) and 
Jefferson and colleagues (2014) (10,11). One expert explained that synthetic biology 
makes it look like someone could “simply write a protocol for how to create a super-
strength virus” but, in reality, infrastructure and knowledge are needed in order to follow 
such protocol and therefore “the real threat” still “comes from large actors and 
organisations at state level”. 
The interviewed experts generally agreed that the scientific research argument for 
retaining the stocks has largely disappeared, but that any attempts to chemically 
synthesize whole-scale variola virus would likely give rise to suspicion and alarm at the 
international level. One expert argued that retaining the physical virus stocks now 
primarily serves a national security purpose: destroying the stocks “is always something 
people and governments are unwilling to do because it is like a nuclear option in that if 
people think you have the intact virus, it serves as a bit of a deterrent.” So while the 
retention/destruction debate is often cast as a scientific and technical debate, he argued 
that it will increasingly become more political and national security focused. 
 
Dangerous Knowledge  
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Most experts interviewed agreed that synthetic biology has added a new dimension to the 
politicization of an already highly political debate. Synthetic biology was seen as having 
linked the retention/destruction debate to broader discussions about oversight of life 
science advances, and in particular to discussions about the production of dangerous 
knowledge and the restriction of scientific research.  
Focusing on this second theme, i.e. the information available for misuse, the 
interviewees generally acknowledged that information is available that could be misused, 
but most were quick to highlight that this information does not come in the form of 
‘recipes’ or ‘how-to’ manuals—echoing Michael Kenney’s work on techne (abstract 
technical knowledge) and mētis (practical, experiential knowledge) (12,13,14). One 
expert said, for instance: “In my opinion, you do not find a complete recipe which gives 
all details from step A to Z on how to recreate a virus, especially the smallpox virus. This 
information is simply not there. But there is enough technical information available which 
shows you how to accomplish several critical steps on the way to recreating a virus.” 
Another expert pointed out, for instance, that while the genome sequence of one of the 
strands of variola major is available online, there is not a publicly available scientific 
paper that provides a protocol for how to recreate the variola virus from the sequence.  
The difficulty of using the information, despite it being available, was echoed by 
a number of the interviewees. One expert noted that “the DNA sequences of many viruses 
are readily available but that doesn’t necessarily mean you can make one. And even if 
you can manufacture one, put the chemical bits together, it doesn’t mean it is going to be 
a live functioning virus, scientists still have problems with that. … And even if you know 
how to make one it certainly does not mean you are able to make a weapon.” Similarly, 
another expert pointed to barriers created by a lack of expertise and a “deep scientific 
background” to make sense of most scientific information. And even scientific expertise 
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is not always enough; scientists often have difficulties replicating each other’s 
experiments: “There are potentially large obstacles to being able to use information on 
how to recreate a virus…if you are not the person involved in the original experiment.” 
Or, as someone else pointed out, “Just being a biologist is not enough. …you need lots of 
skills in order to do these experiments.” Others highlighted the role of infrastructure and 
the expertise of groups rather than lone individuals. 
Despite the general consistency of views on this, it was also noted that just 
because an experiment is hard “it doesn’t mean it is impossible”, especially considering 
the rapid advances in technology and life sciences: “we have possibilities [now that] we 
did not have 20 years ago”. 
 
Accidental Releases   
 
A third theme that arose related to the retention/destruction debate was concern about 
accidents, with the majority of experts interviewed believing accidental releases more 
likely than an intentional release of variola. Many noted how common accidents are, and 
referenced recent biosafety breaches at high security labs in the US, including labs run 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)—one of the two WHO 
Collaborating Centres for the smallpox stocks. References were also made to the 30-year 
old live smallpox virus found in a disused refrigerator at the National Institutes of Health 
in 2014, and concerns were expressed about other forgotten or mislabelled stocks that 
could pose a danger. The deliberate retention of stocks in facilities outside of the two 
official WHO Collaborating Centres was also raised. 
 Many thought the possibility to synthetically manufacture variola provided clear 
grounds for eliminating the physical virus stocks: as the virus can be ‘brought back’ at 
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any point, the stocks would become irrelevant: “We simply don’t need them anymore”. 
And getting rid of the stocks was perceived as decreasing the risk of accidental releases. 
In one expert’s judgement: “For me it is a question of balance and I think, on balance, 
destroying the stocks would make us slightly safer.”  
But some were concerned that labelling the stocks as irrelevant could create 
additional security concerns around the stocks. Because of their physical location in the 
US and in the Russian Federation, one expert explained, “If we went down the path of ‘if 
you destroy, I destroy,’ I am not sure the Americans would believe that the Russians have 
destroyed them just like the Russians would not believe the Americans have. It would 
create more security concerns than it would help.” 
Another concern raised by eliminating the stocks in an age of synthetic biology 
was that it could create a “false hope, a false promise, a fantasy of security”, not just 
because the virus could deliberately be recreated in its entirety, but because it would not 
be a solution to all the other issues wrapped up in the debate.  
 
Eradication 
 
The final theme relates to eradication. The interviews suggested that the experts 
interviewed held different understandings of the meaning of eradication. Some 
considered eradication at the disease level, in terms of ‘circulating virus’, and believed 
the disease can be eradicated even if there are still some reservoirs of the virus. Others 
considered eradication at the viral level, where the presence of variola stocks meant 
‘complete eradication’ was not yet achieved.  
 In this context, the possibility of re-creating a virus in the laboratory was judged 
by most experts as a factor affecting the concept of eradication as they understood it. 
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“With synthetic biology, the idea of eradication has been completely undermined: even if 
you can eradicate a virus in nature scientists can re-create it in the laboratory. This is 
just to say that we need to look at how the idea of eradication worked in different contexts 
and how people still believe in the idea of eradication even though absolute eradication 
is not possible.” Others highlighted that the possibility of re-creating variola synthetically 
means eradication can no longer be linked with permanence: “As a consequence of 
synthetic biology there may not be a permanent eradication, and we must always remain 
open to the possibility of people recreating it in the future.” However, it was pointed out 
that the possibility of something happening does not necessarily mean that it will occur, 
and “in 400 hundred years’ time [we] could look back and still say there has not been a 
case of smallpox since the late 1970s”.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Analysis of the findings shows a range of opinions on the implications of synthetic 
biology for the smallpox stocks debate, as well as on the dynamics and wider debates in 
which it lies. The findings are in line with previous studies on biological threat 
judgements where substantial diversity of views has also been found among experts 
(6,10,11).  
The variety of opinion on the implications of synthetic biology for the smallpox 
stocks debate could lead to increased uncertainty in future risk assessments of potential 
smallpox outbreaks. It could also lead to increased challenges in reaching agreement on 
appropriate regulation of variola research, and more hesitation at a time when decisive 
steps need to be taken to manage the risk of a man-made smallpox outbreak.  
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Although the study was small, and can only be indicative not representative, it 
suggests that the emphasis of European-based experts’ perspectives may differ somewhat 
from that of their American counterparts. A further, more comprehensive, study would 
be required to bear this out.  
Finally, the study has shown that synthetic biology essentially affects all the main 
discourses within the smallpox stocks debate: from biosecurity to the meaning of 
eradication itself. However, advances in synthetic biology do not seem to be causing a 
shift towards either retention or destruction of smallpox stocks, and arguably gives rise 
to novel risks and additional questions, thus complicating and extending the eradication 
debate. As one interviewee put it: “Synthetic biology has affected the debate on both sides 
but has not got us anywhere closer to a solution.” 
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